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INTRODUCTION 
 
Both domestic and Strasbourg jurisprudence make it clear that, where a social 
landlord seeks their tenant’s eviction, the right to respect for the home in art.8 of the 
ECHR accords the resident occupier a right to have the proportionality of that 
eviction assessed by a court.1 The key question for the Strasbourg Court in FJM2 was 
whether this procedural dimension to art.8 also applies where a private party seeks 
an eviction.  
 
FJM was the assured shorthold tenant of a house owned by her parents in Witney, 
Oxfordshire. FJM’s parents bought the property in order to provide her with a home 
as her severe long-term behavioural and psychiatric problems had left her without 
accommodation and unable to work. FJM was granted a series of assured shorthold 
tenancies (ASTs) and the rent owed was paid through her housing benefit. However, 
the parents fell into arrears and could not repay the loan when the monies fell due. 
The appointed receivers subsequently tolerated FJM’s occupancy for a period, before 
serving her with a s.21 notice approximately three years after the fixed-term of her 
last AST lapsed. 
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1 McCann v United Kingdom (19009/04) (2008) 47 E.H.R.R. 40, [50]; Kay v United Kingdom 
(37341/06) (2012) 54 E.H.R.R. 30 [68]; Manchester City Council v Pinnock [2010] UKSC 45; 
[2011] 2 A.C. 104 [49]. 
2 FJM v United Kingdom (76202/16) [2019] H.L.R. 8. 
S.21 of the Housing Act 1988 regulates court orders for possession in respect of 
expired or terminated assured shorthold tenancies of dwelling-houses. FJM had an 
assured periodic shorthold tenancy at the time the notice was served and therefore 
s.21(4) dealt with her case. S.21(4) is mandatory provision, requiring courts to order 
possession where a landlord has served a notice in accordance with its terms.  
 
FJM complained that her inability to raise any human rights-based defence to 
possession proceedings breached her Convention rights. She also argued that, in her 
case, a possession order was in fact a disproportionate breach of those rights. In 
McDonald, the domestic iteration of the case, both the Court of Appeal3 and the 
Supreme Court4 gave short shrift to these arguments. FJM applied to the ECtHR, 
hoping it would be more sympathetic to her plight. 
 
 
DOMESTIC CASE HISTORY  
 
FJM’s argument before the domestic courts involved three sequential steps. First, 
FJM contended that art.8 entitled her to have the proportionality of her eviction 
assessed by the court making the possession order. While all three domestic courts 
apparently conceded art.8’s engagement (thus accepting the “applicability”5 element 
to this submission),6 they nonetheless concluded that a proportionality assessment 
was not required in the private eviction context as existing authorities failed to 
                                                
3 McDonald v McDonald [2014] EWCA Civ 1049; [2015] Ch 357. Before this court FJM also put 
forward the argument that the appointed receivers were not permitted to serve a s.21 notice, 
see [61]-[65]. This ground was abandoned in subsequent appeals. 
4 McDonald  v McDonald [2016] UKSC 28; [2017] AC 273. 
5 Borrowing Amy Goymour’s language: see A. Goymour, “Property and Housing” in D 
Hoffmann (ed), The Impact of the UK Human Rights Act on Private Law (CUP, 2011), p.251. 
6 McDonald [2016] UKSC 28 [59] (although with some reluctance); McDonald [2014] EWCA 
Civ 1049 [12]. Cf Arden LJ’s later reliance on Di Palma v United Kingdom (1986) 10 E.H.R.R. 
149 where the Commission concluded A1P1 was not engaged at [36]. 
establish such a right.7 In other words, there was no breach on “compatibility” 
grounds.8 Lord Neuberger and Lady Hale, giving the Supreme Court’s unanimous 
judgment, took their analysis one step further, providing reasons why no 
proportionality assessment was needed “as a matter of principle”9 under the 
Convention.10 Significantly, several of these reasons – the presence of a contractual 
relationship and relevant legislation weighing the parties’ conflicting A1P1 and art.8 
rights – were seized upon by the Strasbourg Court when the point was re-argued in 
FJM.11  
 
As FJM failed to overcome step one, there was strictly no need for the domestic 
courts to consider the remaining steps. FJM’s second contention was that the Human 
Rights Act 1998 enabled the 1988 Act to be read in such a way as to accommodate 
her proportionality claim, notwithstanding the mandatory nature of section 21(4).12 
Neither the County Court nor the Court of Appeal addressed this point, while the 
Supreme Court gave the obiter opinion that the 1988 Act’s limits precluded such a 
conclusion.13 
 
Finally, FJM argued that an order for possession was disproportionate on the facts of 
her case. FJM’s psychiatrist’s evidence stood in her favour. He contended that upon 
eviction there was “a significant possibility that she would become homeless”,14 
likely “requiring admission to hospital” given the impact on her mental health.15 
                                                
7 McDonald [2016] UKSC 28 [59]; McDonald [2014] EWCA Civ 1049 [45], see also [17] for 
discussion of the trial judge’s reasoning. 
8 Again, using Goymour’s language: A. Goymour, “Property and Housing” in The Impact of 
the UK Human Rights Act on Private Law (2011), p.5. 
9 McDonald [2016] UKSC 28 [47]. 
10 McDonald [2016] UKSC 28  [40]-[46]. 
11 FJM [2019] H.L.R. 8 [42]. 
12 Relying on the Human Rights Act 1998 ss.3 and 6. 
13 McDonald [2016] UKSC 28 [70]. 
14 FJM [2019] H.L.R. 8 [7]. 
15 McDonald [2016] UKSC 28 [7]. 
Even if alternative accommodation were sourced, “harm to herself or suicide” and 
“violence towards others” remained possibilities.16 This evidence helped to convince 
the first-instance judge that, were he allowed to assess proportionality, an order 
would be disproportionate.17 The Court of Appeal and the Supreme Court decided 
otherwise, emphasising the rarity of instances where a possession order is 
disproportionate per se in light of the strong A1P1 rights of landlords and interested 
third parties such as lenders.18  
 
 
STRASBOURG DECISION 
 
The Strasbourg Court began its assessment of the complaints by restating familiar 
principles. It reiterated that, while “it is for national authorities to make the initial 
assessment of necessity” who in turn “enjoy a margin of appreciation”, it retains the 
final say on compliance.19 The Court repeated its statement in McCann that “the loss 
of one’s home is the most extreme form of interference with right to respect for the 
home” and, as such, “any person at risk of an interference of this magnitude should 
in principle be able to have the proportionality of the measure determined by an 
independent tribunal” (the McCann principle).20  
 
Nonetheless, the Court ultimately concurred with the domestic authorities: FJM 
could not use the Convention to challenge her eviction. The Court’s finding was 
                                                
16  McDonald [2016] UKSC 28 [7]. 
17 McDonald [2014] EWCA Civ 1049 [46]. 
18 McDonald [2014] EWCA Civ 1049  [47]-[53], McDonald [2016] UKSC 28 [72]-[75]. See also 
Europa Oil & Gas Ltd v Persons Unknown [2017] EWHC 403 (Ch); [2017] 1 WLUK 346, at [16], 
applying McDonald: “the balance against protection under Article 8 firmly falls in favour of a 
land-owner… [art.8] could not possibly trump those rights”. 
19 FJM [2019] H.L.R. 8 [33]-[34]. 
20 FJM [2019] H.L.R. 8 [36], citing McCann (2008) 47 E.H.R.R. 40 [50]. 
primarily based on its previous judgment in Vrzic,21 another private eviction case. 
After suggesting that the McCann principle had “primarily been applied in cases 
where applicants had been living in state-owned or socially-owned 
accommodation”, 22 the Court contended that Vrzic “expressly acknowledged, for the 
first time,” that it “did not automatically apply in cases where possession was sought 
by private individual or enterprise”.23 Any statements to the contrary were, 
apparently, “clarified” by that more recent pronouncement.24 
 
The Court elaborated that eviction proceedings brought by private persons are 
“distinguishable” from evictions initiated by public bodies because the latter involve 
private property rights.25 In a passage echoing the Supreme Court, it stated that such 
claims are distinct because “two private individuals or entities have entered 
voluntarily into a contractual relationship in respect of which the legislature has 
prescribed how their respective Convention rights are to be respected”.26 In its view, 
therefore, “the balance between the interests of the private individual … and the 
residential occupier could be struck by legislation”.27 
 
The Court found that FJM’s occupancy was regulated by a contractual relationship, 
which implicitly incorporated the 1988 Act’s regulation of how and when her 
possession could be ended.28 It also determined that the 1988 Act “reflects the State’s 
assessment of where the balance should be struck between the art.8 rights of 
residential tenants and the art.1 of Protocol No.1 rights of private sector landlords”.29 
                                                
21 Vrzic v Croatia (43777/13) (2018) 66 E.H.R.R. 30. 
22 FJM [2019] H.L.R. 8 [37]. 
23 FJM [2019] H.L.R. 8 [41] (emphasis added). 
24 FJM [2019] H.L.R. 8 [39]. 
25 FJM [2019] H.L.R. 8 [40]. 
26 FJM [2019] H.L.R. 8 [42]. 
27 FJM [2019] H.L.R. 8 [41] (emphasis added). 
28 FJM [2019] H.L.R. 8 [43]. 
29 FJM [2019] H.L.R. 8. 
It accepted the Supreme Court’s analysis that the “the authorities had regard … to 
the general public interest in reinvigorating the private residential rented sector” (i.e. 
was pursuing a legitimate aim), and that this was “best achieved through contractual 
certainty and consistency in the application of the law” (i.e. was necessary in a 
democratic society).30 In any event, the Court noted the domestic law accords tenants 
some protection from eviction as enforcement action can be postponed for up to six 
weeks in cases of “exceptional hardship”.31 
 
 
COMMENT 
 
The Court’s reasoning in FJM is beguiled by its unsatisfactory treatment of 
authorities. Whilst it recognised that it had previously expressed a general principle 
that those facing eviction should have the opportunity to have the proportionality of 
that measure assessed by a court,32 the Court instead relied on a single contrary 
authority33 disapplying this principle in ‘private landlord’ cases.34 Thus, the Court 
framed the precedent as clear and its overall conclusion self-evident: the cases have 
never applied the established principles to those facing private eviction, so the 
applicant loses. In fact, the Court was so confident that FJM was an ‘easy’ case that 
gave its answer in the format of a ‘Decision’: a species of ECtHR output with 
abridged reasoning short of a full judgment. This format is usually used to filter out 
applications which fail to comply with the Court’s procedural rules.35 However, and 
                                                
30 FJM [2019] H.L.R. 8. 
31 FJM [2019] H.L.R. 8 [44]. 
32 see e.g. Connors v United Kingdom (66746/07) (2005) 40 E.H.R.R. 9; McCann (2008) 47 
E.H.R.R. 40; Kay (2012) 54 E.H.R.R. 30. 
33 Vrzic (2018) 66 E.H.R.R. 30. 
34 FJM [2019] H.L.R. 8, 40-42. 
35 e.g. falling foul of time limits, or failing to exhaust domestic remedies: art.35 ECHR. 
more controversially,36 a Decision may be used to deal with “manifestly ill-
founded”37 cases where the merits are seemingly so self-evidently hopeless that the 
claim “does not disclose any appearance of a violation of the rights guaranteed by 
the Convention”.38 Apparently, FJM was such a case. 
 
This is surprising. FJM raises a controversial and salient point about the 
Convention’s operation in a novel area.39 The appeal came from a seven-member 
panel of the Supreme Court. Most importantly, FJM raises more complex issues than 
the Court acknowledged. Its characterisation of the case as a straightforward 
application of settled principles is simply unfaithful to the reality of the case law 
(indeed, the domestic proceedings were littered with references to the uncertain 
Strasbourg position).40 FJM presented an ideal opportunity for the Court to 
authoritatively resolve these highly-contested issues. Instead, a dubiously-reasoned 
Decision was given which failed to properly consider relevant authorities and 
misconstrued those it did cite.  
 
i. Failure to consider relevant authorities 
 
                                                
36 see e.g. J. Gerhards, “Inadmissibility Decisions of the European Court of Human Rights: A 
Critique of the Lack of Reasoning” (2014) 14(1) H.R.L.R. 148, 153-158.  
37 art.35(3) ECHR. 
38 European Court of Human Rights, “Practical Guide on Admissibility Criteria” (31 
December 2018), echr.coe.int, https://www.echr.coe.int/Documents/Admissibility_guide_ENG.pdf 
[Accessed 16 March 2019], pp. 59 and 61.  
39 The Jurisconsult believes that the case is “of jurisprudential interest” because it involves 
the “regulation of the private rental sector”: “Annual Report 2018 of the European Court of 
Human Rights, Council of Europe” (2018), echr.coe.int, 
https://www.echr.coe.int/Documents/Annual_report_2018_ENG.pdf [Accessed 16 March 2019], p. 
39. 
40 e.g. McDonald [2014] EWCA Civ 1049 [24]-[25].  
As Nield has noted in this journal,41 the McCann principle appears, on its surface, to 
be without qualification, holding that “any person” facing eviction should be able to 
have the proportionality of that action assessed.42 Given that a majority of tenancies 
across Europe are private,43 the application of this principle to such arrangements is 
surely a tenable insinuation. More concretely, the Court has expressly required the 
proportionality of an eviction to be assessed in numerous cases involving two 
private parties. Such cases have concerned enforced sale and seizure of the home to 
satisfy private debts,44 eviction and sale of property by an ex-partner,45 demolition of 
a house on a co-owned plot of land,46 eviction from a housing co-operative,47 and 
straightforward evictions from private property.48 In these cases, the Court stressed 
not only the relevance of the McCann principle,49 but that cases should be examined 
carefully (on a “case by case” basis),50 reasons should normally be provided51 and 
parties must be able to “participate effectively” in proceedings.52 Thus, in a number 
                                                
41 S. Nield, “Shutting the door on horizontal effect: McDonald v McDonald” [2017] 1 Conv. 
60, 67 
42 See e.g. Buckland v United Kingdom (40060/08) (2013) 56 E.H.R.R. 16 [65]; Lemo v Croatia 
(3925/10) unreported 10 July 2014 [40]. The formulation is repeated in FJM itself: FJM [2019] 
H.L.R. 8 [36]. 
43 In 2018 19.9% of the EU’s population rented at a market price, while 10.8% were tenants 
with reduced-rent or free accommodation: Eurostat, “Housing Statistics” (May 2018), 
ec.europa.eu,  https://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/statistics-
explained/index.php/Housing_statistics#Tenure_status [Accessed 16 March 2019]. 
44 Zehentner v Austria (20082/02) (2011) 52 E.H.R.R. 22; Rousk v Sweden (27183/04) unreported 
25 July 2013. 
45 Zrilić v Croatia (46726/11) unreported 3 October 2013. 
46 Ivanova v Bulgaria (46577/15) (2017) 65 E.H.R.R. 20. 
47 Sagvolden v Norway (21682/11) unreported 20 December 2016. 
48 Brežec v Croatia (7717/10) [2014] H.L.R. 3; Lemo (3925/10) unreported 10 July 2014; Belchikova 
v Russia (2408/06) unreported 25 March 2010; Mustafa v Sweden (23883/06) (2011) 52 E.H.R.R. 
24 (an art.10 case that is applicable in the current context). 
49 Brežec [2014] H.L.R. 3 [45]; Zrilić (46726/11) unreported 3 October 2013 [65]. Indeed, often 
the Court simply imports the jurisprudence of the public eviction cases: see e.g. Sagvolden 
(21682/11) unreported 20 December 2016 [139]. 
50 Ivanova (2017) 65 E.H.R.R. 20 [54] 
51 Ivanova (2017) 65 E.H.R.R. 20 [53]. 
52 Zehentner (2011) 52 E.H.R.R. 22 [65] 
of instances, a breach of art.8 was found where the eviction was not, or could not be, 
reviewed in this manner.53 
 
However, worryingly, most of these authorities were not acknowledged in FJM,54 
never mind clearly and thoughtfully distinguished. The most attention was given to 
Brežec,55 with the Court making an underdeveloped suggestion that it turned on its 
particular facts (notably that the property had been owned and managed by the state 
for many years before privatisation).56  
 
Instead, the Court relied on a handful of cases supporting the conclusion that a 
proportionality assessment was unnecessary in the present context. For example, the 
Court has decided certain cases in a way that seems to suggest that states may bear 
no responsibility for ensuring the Convention-compliance of purely private 
relationships, even if the arrangements regulating those relationships are enforced 
through a court.57 In addition, one judge has explicitly stated, albeit in a concurring 
opinion which was not joined by his colleagues, that a proportionality assessment 
“shouldn’t come into the equation” in private evictions.58 But these authorities 
neither constitute an established line of case law, nor carry the weight attributed to 
them in FJM. They certainly do not justify disposing of the case at the Decision stage. 
 
                                                
53 Brežec [2014] H.L.R. 3 [50]-[51]; Lemo (3925/10) unreported 10 July 2014 [45]; Ivanova (2017) 
65 E.H.R.R. 20 [58], [61]-[62]. cf Zrilić (46726/11) unreported 3 October 2013 [66]-[68] and 
Belchikova (2408/06) unreported 25 March 2010. 
54 Beyond Brežec, a small number are recognized in FJM [2019] H.L.R. 8, [37]-[38]: Zehentner 
(2011) 52 E.H.R.R. 22, Rousk (27183/04) unreported 25 July 2013, Ivanova (2017) 65 E.H.R.R. 
20. 
55 Brežec [2014] H.L.R. 3.  
56 FJM [2019] H.L.R. 8 [38]. Yet in Brežec the Court acknowledged the flats had been privately 
owned for a significant period prior to the eviction: Brežec [2014] H.L.R. 3 [48]. 
57 Di Palma (1986) 10 E.H.R.R. 149, 210; Kotov v Russia (54522/00) unreported 3 April 2012 
[90]. 
58 Buckland (2013) 56 E.H.R.R. 16, per Judge De Gaetano. 
ii. Misconstruction of existing authority 
 
Rather than attempting to reconcile these disparate authorities, the Court simply 
says that the law has been “clarified”59 by its more recent pronouncement in Vrzic.60 
But the Court’s treatment of that case is also deeply flawed. Vrzic is treated as 
authority for the proposition that an individual proportionality assessment is never 
required in private eviction cases.61 On the contrary, the Court in Vrzic simply said 
that an obligation to conduct an individual proportionality assessment would not 
arise “automatically” in cases between private parties.62 It said that private evictions 
might be “different” from those initiated by the state,63 but this is largely due to the 
weight of the additional (private) interests in play, including A1P1. The fact that the 
case involved private parties was “an important aspect”64 of its evaluation, but there 
was no suggestion that this was definitive. As such, Vrzic leaves room for the 
possibility that, in certain private landlord cases, an obligation to conduct an 
individual proportionality assessment might indeed arise, where the facts are such 
that applicant’s private life rights would outweigh even the very significant property 
rights of the landlord. In Vrzic, it was the facts of the particular case, including the 
amount of debt owed and the behaviour of the parties which led to the Court finding 
that no proportionality assessment was required.65 
 
This exercise did not occur in FJM. Instead, the Court moved beyond Vrzic, 
suggesting that the distinction between evictions sought by private landlords and 
                                                
59 FJM [2019] H.L.R. 8 [39]. See further “Annual Report 2018 of the European Court of 
Human Rights, Council of Europe”, p.108. 
60 Note that in Vrzic, the Court erroneously considered Brežec to involve an eviction from 
state-owned property: see Vrzic (2018) 66 E.H.R.R. 30 [66]. 
61 FJM [2019] H.L.R. 8 [43]. 
62 FJM [2019] H.L.R. 8  [41]. 
63 Vrzic (2018) 66 E.H.R.R. 30 [67]. 
64 Vrzic (2018) 66 E.H.R.R. 30 [66]. 
65 Vrzic (2018) 66 E.H.R.R. 30 [69]-[72]. This approach fits with that taken in Kotov (54522/00) 
unreported 3 April 2012 [109]-[113] 
those sought by public bodies “runs deeper”66 than previously appreciated. The 
Court said: 
 
“What sets claims for possession by private sector owners against residential 
occupiers apart is that the two private individuals or entities have entered 
voluntarily into a contractual relationship in respect of which the legislature 
has prescribed how their respective Convention rights are to be respected… 
[i]f the domestic courts could override the balance struck by the legislation in 
such a case, the Convention would be directly enforceable between private 
citizens so as to alter the contractual rights and obligations that they had 
freely entered into.”67 
 
Thus, FJM lost not because the private law rights of her landlords outweighed her 
individual art.8 rights, but because that balancing exercise is, seemingly, 
impermissible under the Convention’s structure. This move not only artificially 
construes Vrzic, treating it, unfairly, as prohibiting any judicial oversight 
whatsoever, but also re-frames what was a question of fact (‘do the interests at stake 
in the private relationship warrant a proportionality assessment?’) into a pure 
question of law (‘is there a private relationship which automatically forecloses a 
proportionality assessment?’). Thus, even if it can be said that Vrzic constitutes the 
prevailing Strasbourg authority, the Court left it behind in FJM. 
 
iii. Problematic substantive reasoning: horizontal effect 
 
In order to make the move past Vrzic the Court relied a concern that the Convention 
would have direct horizontal effect. This reasoning merits close scrutiny. 
                                                
66 FJM [2019] H.L.R. 8 [42]. 
67 FJM [2019] H.L.R. 8 [42]. 
 Horizontal effect concerns the scope of the Convention’s application. In brief, the 
Convention does not directly apply in disputes exclusively between private parties 
as state responsibility is not engaged.68 Given that questions of compatibility do not 
arise if the Convention has no application, the question of applicability should be a 
distinct, logically prior, issue. In FJM, the Court implicitly assumed that the eviction 
order interfered with FJM’s art.8(1) rights.69 This should have ended arguments as to 
applicability, with the remainder of the case considering compatibility arguments. 
However, these two issues were elided, causing the Court’s overall conclusion to be 
shaped by fundamentally inconsistent arguments.  
 
On the one hand, Convention compatibility was considered to be maintained by the 
balance struck between the art.8 rights of tenants and the A1P1 rights of landlords in 
s.21(4) of the 1988 Act. On the other, the Court was concerned that FJM’s argument 
would render the Convention “directly enforceable between private citizens”70: an 
(apparently71) impermissible species of horizontal effect. If the Convention did not 
apply, why did the Court bother discussing the 1988 Act’s compatibility and frame 
the question in these terms? Equally, if the Convention did apply, why was an 
argument relating to the admissibility of the complaint allowed to influence its 
conclusion on the compatibility issues it raised? Either the Convention was 
inapplicable to the current case, rendering cases on compatibility such as Vrzic 
                                                
68 see e.g. Di Palma (1986) 10 E.H.R.R. 149, 210.  
69 The Court has previously confirmed that an eviction order has this effect: Vrzic (2018) 66 
E.H.R.R. 30 [59]. 
70 FJM [2019] H.L.R. 8 [42]. 
71 It is clear that some manifestations of “horizontal effect” are not so impermissible. For 
example, domestic courts have developed common law causes of action in disputes between 
two private parties: Fearn v Board of Trustees of the Tate Gallery [2019] EWHC 246 (Ch); Times, 
March 07, 2019 [170]-[178].	
totally irrelevant, or it was applicable, rendering the court’s strained gloss on Vrzic a 
pointless addition.72 
  
Related to this point is the questionable role played by contractual agreements. 
FJM’s lease was the device used to introduce the horizontal effect point. While it 
seems safe to say that a contractual agreement affects the Convention’s application 
in the A1P1 context,73 it is less clear whether the same argument holds true in art.8 
cases. Unlike the right to protection of property, which is necessarily shaped by any 
contract creating that proprietary entitlement, art.8 protects our interests in the home 
– a “factual state of affairs”74 which is notoriously alien to traditional property law 
reasoning and rhetoric.75 Given that art.8 is not dependent on a proprietary 
entitlement existing,76 it is hard to see why a contract – a property law device – can 
be used to exclude the protection it offers. Surely the contract’s proper place, 
consistent with case-law in the social housing context,77 is as a weighty consideration 
in a proportionality assessment. 
 
Let us consider the agreement actually made by this tenant, described by the court as 
“freely entered into”.78 Although the validity of FJM’s lease was never questioned on 
the ground of incapacity,79 it seems unlikely that she was aware of its finer details. 
Moreover, given her previous housing history, she was also largely dependent on 
                                                
72 For a related argument see E. Lees, “Article 8, proportionality and horizontal effect” [2017] 
L.Q.R. 31, 32. 
73 See A. Goymour, “Property and Housing” in The Impact of the UK Human Rights Act on 
Private Law (2011), p.279. 
74 Lees, “Article 8, proportionality and horizontal effect” [2017] L.Q.R. 31, 35. 
75 R. Walsh, “Stability and Predictability in English Property Law – the Impact of Article 8 of 
the European Convention on Human Rights Reassessed” [2015] L.Q.R. 586, 607. 
76 McCann (2008) 47 E.H.R.R. 40 [46]; Chapman v United Kingdom (27238/95) (2001) 33 E.H.R.R. 
18 [102]. 
77 Pinnock [2010] UKSC 45 [52]; Hounslow LBC v Powell [2011] UKSC 8; [2011] 2 AC  186 [80]. 
78 FJM [2019] H.L.R. 8, [42]. 
79 For the effect of incapacity on a contract see: Imperial Loan Co Ltd v Stone (1892) 1 QB 599, 
601. 
the support offered by parents. To say that a valid contract limits Convention 
protection (the court’s effective conclusion) is to effectively sweep any details as to 
the quality of that consent under the rug. Surely such considerations ought to be 
relevant to a proportionality assessment if concluded? Unfortunately, the move in 
FJM signals a triumph of form over substance. 
 
Finally, FJM’s particular circumstances return us to horizontal effect. Even accepting 
that horizontal effect was relevant, the Court’s treatment of it was overly simplistic. 
It is at least arguable that the domestic court in FJM was not some passive conduit 
for the private parties’ actions.80 Since national courts are emanations of the state,81 
the state retains at least a peripheral role in the enforcement of private eviction 
orders. As Lees puts it, “[i]f a court order is sought, it is enforced by the state”.82 This 
idea was simply not examined.  
 
Equally, the idea that the UK may have been under a positive obligation to 
safeguard FJM’s art.8 rights from an interference by a private party went 
underexplored.83 Nield has highlighted the relevance of “intermediate 
horizontality”84 to FJM’s case and the failure of the domestic courts to give serious 
consideration to this species of horizontal effect. Positive obligations can both 
expand the scope of the Convention’s application and increase the intensity of 
                                                
80 This idea prevailed in the old case of Di Palma (1986) 10 E.H.R.R. 149. Yet in Zrilić 
(46726/11) unreported 3 October 2013 the state made exactly this argument ([54]) and failed.  
81 see e.g. Human Rights Act 1998 s.6. 
82 Lees, “Article 8, proportionality and horizontal effect” [2017] L.Q.R. 31, 32. see Zrilić 
(46726/11) unreported 3 October 2013 [63]: an “inevitable interference” even when 
upholding settlement. 
83 See Nield, “Shutting the door on horizontal effect: McDonald v McDonald” [2017] 1 Conv. 
60, 68. 
84 ibid. 
protection offered thereunder.85 They exist because of the state’s obligation to secure 
the ability of every individual to effectively exercise their Convention rights. 
 
Previous Strasbourg jurisprudence has justified the imposition of positive 
obligations with reference to the particular vulnerability of the applicant.86 While the 
Court explicitly recognized FJM’s particular vulnerability,87 it failed to consider this 
vulnerability in its analysis of horizontal effect. Peroni and Timmer have highlighted 
how vulnerability can affect how a proportionality assessment should be 
conducted.88 Might it not also be relevant to the question of whether a 
proportionality assessment was procedurally required under the Convention?89 
These issues could and should have been explored in FJM. Instead, the court’s 
treatment of the applicant’s vulnerability was merely cursory. 
 
 
CONCLUSION 
 
FJM is both procedurally and substantively an unsatisfying case. But what are its 
broader implications for principle and practice? Here, as with Vrzic, the Strasbourg 
Court was prepared to allow “property values”90 of “certainty”, “consistency” and 
“agreement” to shape its conclusions on the Convention’s operation. If the advent of 
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the Human Rights Act and the art.8 eviction cases culminating in Pinnock suggested 
that the Convention might change property law reasoning,91 FJM seems to indicate 
that in the long-term the opposite may be true. The lasting impact may be of 
property law on human rights thinking, not the other way around. 
 
More practically, what, if any, is the next move for future tenants like FJM who are 
experiencing vulnerability and face private eviction proceedings? One avenue 
would be challenge the underlying validity of the lease at the possession stage on the 
ground of incapacity. Of course, this course of action would come with its own 
problems – establishing the cause of action, overcoming any bars to rescission, and 
indeed showing that the Convention applies in this context. Alternatively, an 
eviction could be challenged under the Equality Act, but this avenue will only be 
open if the eviction raises discrimination on the grounds of disability. It is not clear 
how that point could have arisen in a case like the present. In terms of the ECHR, 
however, it seems that neither the Supreme Court nor Strasbourg Court show a 
particularly strong appetite for such a challenge. 
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